Abstract. Scream vocalizations of group-living rhesus macaques provoked by higher-ranking aggressors were examined in two contexts: encounters in which the rank difference between opponents was either large or small. Such vocalizations are important in eliciting support from the caller's allies in the group (usually matrilineal kin). Five acoustically distinct recruitment screams encode specific information about features of the agonistic context, for example, relative rank of the opponent and the severity of the attack. Against higher-ranking opponents, noisy screams are most likely to be given during encounters that involve contact aggression, and tonal or undulated screams are most likely for non-contact aggression. We predicted that scream bouts directed to small rank difference opponents would be more likely to comprise calls from scream classes other than the expected type, and that scream bouts from large rank difference encounters would be more in accord with the expected class. For large rank difference bouts, on average 74.2% of calls were of the expected class; for small rank difference bouts, a significantly smaller per cent (53.8%) of calls was accurately predicted. In the large rank difference encounters, 65.6% (55/84) of bouts were composed entirely of expected scream types, but only 47.6% (39/82) were uniformly correct for small rank difference encounters. Large rank difference interactions also yielded significantly fewer bouts where none of the screams produced by the victim of attack belonged to the predicted class. We suggest that a multi-valued or fuzzy logic system, that is one with more than two truth values, might be a more realistic way to conceptualize the categorization of certain referents of monkey vocalizations.
A major goal of animal vocal communication studies has been to discover the referents of signals. Such information is critical to understanding the function and evolution of communication systems in different species and to advancing knowledge about the cognitive and conceptual abilities of animals (e.g. Griffin 1984 Griffin , 1992 Bickerton 1990; Cheney & Seyfarth 1990a, b; Ristau 1990) . Of particular interest is evidence, especially in non-human primates, that signals can represent objects and events in the external world (i.e. have the property of external reference). Such findings raise the possibility that animal communication might share the denotative context independence of human language symbols (Zivin 1986; Cheney & Seyfarth 1990a; Snowdon 1990 Snowdon , 1992 . Smith (1981 Smith ( , 1990 ) has argued, however, that animal signals typically have multiple referents, which complicates both the study of communication as a means to explore the mental lives of animals as well as the task of even identifying the existence of external referents. For example, in some species, signals that appear to index external features of the environment may also have concomitant behavioural correlates and reveal features of the signaller, such as its species, size or individual identity (e.g. Gouzoules & Gouzoules 1989 , 1990a .
Another complicating issue for attempts to study communication in the primate world is that many studies have approached the problem as though the animals classify items with a logic system having only two truth values, 1 or 0 (true and false). Investigators typically have followed the 'essential first step ' (Marler et al. 1992) 
